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On “Bettering Humanity” in Science and Engineering Education.a 
 
ABSTRACT:   
 
Authors such as Krishnamany Selvan argue that “all human endeavors 
including engineering and science” have a single primary objective:  “bettering 
humanity.” They favor discussing “the history of science and measurement 
uncertainty.”  This paper respectfully disagrees and argues that “human 
endeavors including engineering and science” should not pursue  “bettering 
humanity” as their primary objective.  Instead these efforts should first pursue 
individual betterment.  One cannot better humanity without knowing what that 
means.  However, there is no one unified theory of what is to the betterment of 
humanity.  Simultaneously, there is no one field (neither science, nor 
engineering, nor philosophy) entitled to rule univocally.  Perhaps if theorists 
tended their own gardens, the common weal would be tended thereby.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
No less a moral philosopher than Adam Smith wrote:  “I have never 
known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.  It is 
an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words 
need be employed in dissuading them from it.”1 (p.159)  In a recent article in 
Science and Engineering Ethics, Krishnasamy T. Selvan disagrees:  “All human 
endeavors including engineering and science have, or at least ought to have, the 
betterment of humanity as their primary objective.”2 (p.573)  One wonders, which 
is it?  Should one work for humanity’s betterment or not? 
No one would disagree with “bettering humanity” were it clear and easy.  
But, the devil is in the details.  The devil is in Mussolini who asserted, “The state 
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is all embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist much less 
have value”3 (p.14); in Hitler who commanded:  
It is thus necessary that the individual should come to realize that 
his own ego is of no importance in comparison with the existence 
of his nation; that the position of the individual ego is conditioned 
solely by the interests of the nation as a whole . . . .4 (pp.871-872) 
 
Dictators and demagogues have hidden much evil and tyranny in the call 
to “better humanity.”  So, one needs to be sure that any particular call does not 
mask such obvious dangers.  
 More generally, “all human endeavors including engineering and 
science” should not have, “the betterment of humanity” as their primary objective.  
Rather, like any other human practice, these activities should primarily pursue 
individual betterment.  In this way, as Smith suggests, each individual intending 
“only his own gain, . . . is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which was no part of his intention. . . . that of the society . . . 
.”1 (p.159)    This is no libertarian or capitalist harangue, but an attempt to argue 
seriously that the distinction between pursuit of self-interest and public interest 
is philosophically crucial in science and engineering education. 
 
2.  An “Approach for Harmonizing Engineering and Science” Education.  
Selvan and many others claim that a responsible science entails bettering 
humanity.  “It is the attempt of this article,” he charges, “to propose the topics of 
history of science and measurement uncertainty as being relevant in this context 
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for the educators of engineering and science.”  Of course, they are “relevant,” but 
Selvan means that science’s history and measurement uncertainty will model 
respect for “variety and difference.”2 (p.574)   For Selvan, a scientist must be like 
Philolaos who “set the earth in motion,” and not like Ptolomy who scoffed at 
contradictions to his sense experience.  Or one should be like Aristotle who 
“maintained that except in the realm of logic and pure mathematics, it is always 
possible for things to be otherwise than they are,” and then like Oppenheimer 
whose “openness” allowed him to break away from Aristotelian dynamics.   
But, what kind of hodge-podge “respect for difference” is that?  More 
realistically, like Aristotle, one could well be a scientific hero one era and a 
scientific has-been the next.  Selvan claims that “‘the events, procedures and 
results that constitute the sciences have no common structure’ and there are no 
general standards for successful research.”2 (pp.573-575)  Yet, science does have more 
or less objective “standards”--that further a deeper, subterranean and implicit 
historical structure and a political agenda.   The scholastic church co-opted 
Aristotle’s physics because it accorded with its theological vision; the modern 
military-industrial complex applauded Oppenheimer when he helped to deliver 
the atomic bomb and declared him a communist when he balked at delivering 
the vastly more powerful hydrogen bomb.  Where is “bettering humanity” in all 
this? 
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It would be desirable to incorporate a discussion of the nature and 
the fundamental difficulties and limitations inherent in the pursuit 
of science, in particular, and in all processes of thought, in general, 
into the teaching process. 2 (p. 577)    
 
What would be more desirable is to incorporate a discussion of the nature 
and fundamental difficulties, limitations, and agendas inherent in the 
pursuit of a value-free science.   
Selvan believes that “This openness would hopefully bring about 
humility and a true rational outlook. In turn, in the long run, a more 
humane society. . . .2 (p.577)   What is right with such idealism is the idea that 
people become more moral when they think in a logical and systematic 
manner about what they want and how they plan to get it in congress 
with their fellows’ like desires.  “Balanced and open inquiry” and 
“humility” are essential tools for achieving these desired ends, and 
discussions of scientific history and limitations are useful for achieving 
“balanced and open inquiry.”  What is wrong, and what is wrong with 
Selvan’s general approach, is the idea that “a true rational outlook” could 
ever be reached.  In other words, the idea that one can “better humanity” 
assumes that someone knows univocally and unequivocally what that means. 
 Many have written against the “technical fix,” and, instead, support a 
philosophical approach to science and engineering education.  For example, 
Michael McFarland argues against the “paternalistic” view “that the issues 
involved [in nuclear technology] are purely technical and that the public should 
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simply step aside and let the engineers and scientists decide them.”5 (p.163)  
“’Defense in depth’ bespeaks nuclear engineers’ confidence that [the] scientific 
method, carefully applied, can permanently triumph over human fallibility.”5 
(p.163)   
This overconfidence is absurd, says McFarland, given the history of 
human hubris (to take just a small span) from the Titanic to Three Mile Island.  
Mark Manion and William Evan point out in Minding the Machines that of course 
thinking human beings will have to mind the machines.6   Even though machines 
might mind themselves more efficiently (they are usually faster and more 
precise), human beings have to mind the machines minding the machines (or 
mind something somewhere).  There is no God in the machine, there is no 
“intelligence” in the machine.  There are only finite human intelligences each 
concerned to perfect her situation (and sometimes the world) as she sees it. 
Selvan does not go so far as to support the “technical fix” approach to 
engineering and science education.  He writes: 
There are several instances in the history of science that suggest 
that the scientific knowledge, constituted by the body of 
abstractions, deductions, and theories, does not always develop in 
a well-planned and smooth manner.  Several mistakes are often 
committed in the process of its development and the concepts, 
theories and ideologies are transitory results and not time-invariant 
entities2 (p.574) 
 
And yet he also writes “science and technology, . . .” are “admittedly the most 
rational disciplines available today” 2 (p.576).  But, they most emphatically are not.  
He assumes the importance and preeminence of science and engineering in order 
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for discussion of them in particular to lead to “bettering humanity.”  But these are 
not important for “bettering humanity” compared with philosophy (and ethics); 
indeed, the relative importance of science and technology is a philosophical 
question.  The important question when asked to discuss more science and 
engineering is:  what does discussing these prevent one from discussing?  There 
is only so much time in the classroom.  What is rejected when we view science 
and engineering as “the most rational?” 
The assumption of science’s and engineering’s preeminence works pretty 
subtly, but it is ubiquitous.  In their textbook Hold Paramount; The Engineer’s 
Responsibility to Society (2003), Alastair Gunn and P. Aarne Vesilind query, “Why 
can’t ethicists be as efficient as engineers?”7  They imply that engineering is 
somehow more efficient than ethics.   It is difficult to distinguish between the 
authors’ own beliefs and their attempts at provocation, but they write that 
engineers “almost always, . . . make correct technical decisions” and that “there is 
always a more or less right solution to any technical problem, at any one time.  
This is the state of the art answer, the answer on which properly trained and 
experienced professionals, . . . will agree.”7 (p.32)   
In contrast, the problem with ethics “is that there is always more than one 
ethical perspective, more than one value, more than one set of interests, and 
preferences, and ethicists . . . will attach differing weights to the various ethical 
considerations.”7 (p.32)  So, Gunn and Vesilind imply that ethicists make few 
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correct ethical decisions in an area where there are rarely more or less right 
solutions. 
A lot of engineering students agree until their prejudgments are 
subverted.  It is simply false to say that scientists and engineers almost always 
make correct technical decisions.  What exactly is the correct technical decision 
when deciding what to do with the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, human 
cloning, or genetically modified organisms?   
Almost immediately, students exclaim that these examples are unfair. 
They do not assume enough about science or engineering.  They do not assume, 
that science and engineering must deal with more specific applications.   But, this 
response is easily countered with more specific questions.  What is the correct 
technical decision when trying to decide whether to put a rubber bladder in the 
Ford Pinto, or in deciding whether o-rings present a clear and present danger to 
astronauts on board the Challenger?  Even whether to use copper wire or some 
alloy reflects a cost decision (hence an ethical decision--a decision about what is 
good or bad/right or wrong in human behavior) and not a merely “technical” 
decision.b   Such practical, everyday examples are legion (they only become 
“exceptional”—as in these cases—when they are made badly).   
Furthermore, it is a myth that there are always more or less correct 
technical solutions to problems in engineering or science.  When it snows, I 
complain to my engineers about not having a “matter transporter.”  After all, the 
instantaneous transportation of matter is a science and engineering problem.  
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There are technically “right” solutions to problems in science and engineering 
only when those questions are pre-established as within the parameters of science 
and engineering.  For example, a gas obeys the “ideal gas law” (PV=nRT) if one 
assumes that there are no intermolecular forces and collisions are perfectly 
elastic.c   
But, nearly all physical laws are “ideal” in this way.  Identifying X as a 
“problem in science and engineering” assumes that it is already defined and 
specified.  So much so that authors of such constructions really carry their 
solution with them to their description of the problem.  The whole issue is 
circular.  They say “This is a problem of science and engineering because precise 
numerical methods and observational data can be applied,” which is the same 
thing as being able to “come up with a right solution to any problem in science 
and engineering” so it follows that “there is always a more or less correct 
solution to any problem in science or engineering” as they have defined it.   
 Jump out of their narrow definitions of science and engineering to the 
unsettled land where matter instantly transports, space ships transcend the 
speed of light, and ray guns vaporize lazy students, and scientific 
conventionalists are at a loss.   
The problem is that there is no one unified theory of what is to the 
betterment of humanity.  Simultaneously, there is no one field (neither science, 
nor engineering, nor philosophy) entitled to rule univocally on bettering 
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humanity.  Nor is there a single person capable of telling us univocally what 
“bettering humanity” means and how to do it. 
One last example:  In the 16th century Galileo was forced to recant at least 
a few of his scientific discoveries on pain of being expelled from the Church and 
even imprisoned.  These included observation of sunspots and craters on the 
moon that he had seen through his newly fashioned telescope.8  The Church 
Fathers argued that they were “bettering humanity” not Galileo.  Were they?  
Was Galileo?  Even today, the answer is not an unequivocal “yes!” either way.  
Pitfalls such as Galileo’s trial demonstrate that science and engineering education 
(or science and engineering) should have nothing to do with the primary goal of 
“bettering humanity.”  Probably this goal should be secondary.   If we all tend our 
own garden, the common weal will be tended thereby. 
 
3.  Ethical Alternatives to “Bettering Humanity” 
Science and engineering continuously evolve with the hopes and 
aspirations of the world’s societies—that is, together with ethics.  Scientists and 
more particularly engineers live in the settled or congealed part of the world, the 
part that has already been reasonably established within certain boundaries that 
they ignore or forget.  From there, they voyage to the unsettled land to gain 
inspiration and subject matter. 
It is not the case that scientists and engineers “almost always make correct 
technical decisions” or that there is always a single correct decision to be made.  
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Yet, on the other hand, ethics is not as bleak or “relative” as some claim it to be.  
It is simply false to say that there are few correct ethical decisions or few correct 
solutions to ethical problems.   
To show this, I simply write a student’s name on the board (eg. Kareem) 
and prefix it with “I should murder” (“I should murder Kareem”).  Kareem and 
other students usually get the point:  there are certainly settled or established 
propositions in ethics.  It is just that most everyone already knows “do not 
murder,” “do not steal,” “do not covet thy neighbor’s wife,” and so on.  So, we 
ethicists spend more time coming up with reasonable criteria for blowing the 
whistle, or whether one owes loyalty to a company, and other controversial 
matters.  Ethicists live in the unsettled part of the world and take frequent 
voyages back to the settled to apply their theories.  Whenever one makes a 
decision about what is good or bad right or wrong (what is going to make one 
happy, and so on), one makes a decision based on some implicit ethical 
perspective often captured, more or less, in the work of some philosopher or 
other. 
Engineers more than scientist live in the settled area of engineering 
because doing so produces commodities.   They voyage into the unsettled to take 
risks and come up with new designs.  Engineering and science are not more 
important than ethics, or vice versa.  It is all one world.  Engineering knowledge is 
“how to” knowledge (“savoir faire”)—for example, how to build a bomb.  Ethical 
knowledge is a kind of wisdom a “whether” (savoir) to drop that bomb or to 
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build it in the first place.   They are two sides of the same coin.  The philosopher 
Immanual Kant said, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind.”12(A51/B75)   Similarly, engineering without ethics is dangerous; 
ethics without engineering is useless.   Science lies in between engineering and 
ethics, being part technical creation and part philosophical/ hypothetical 
reflection. 
 One must see how ethics works with the practical problem of “bettering 
humanity.”  Michael McFarland asks:   
Suppose that you were aware of a group of people being “mugged” 
by the misuse of a certain type of technology—for example, by 
having a toxic waste dump placed in their town, or by being put in 
danger by shoddy design or construction of their automobile.5 (p.159)   
 
McFarland concludes that engineers or scientists would have an obligation to 
prevent such “mugging.”  Engineers are obligated to assist others if “some 
fundamental right or good” is threatened, if they have the “ability to help, 
without damage to self and without interference with important duties owed to 
others,” and in the “absence of other sources of help.”5(p.160)  He writes about 
Kitty Genovese, the Queen’s woman who was stabbed to death while thirty-eight 
of her neighbors looked on (no one even called the police!).  Neighbors failed to 
act because they felt isolated and helpless.  They had no history of “organized 
social action.”  McFarland concludes that, analogously it therefore behooves 
engineers to organize socially:  perhaps to join the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
perhaps to vocalize through vocational societies such as the Institute of Electric 
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and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) or the National Society of Professional Engineers 
(NSPE).   
Yet, McFarland’s article begs the essential question:  why do engineers or 
scientists have obligations to prevent society from being “mugged” by a 
particular technology?  Selvan’s question was:  why do scientists and engineers 
in particular have the “objective” of bettering humanity?  These are similar. 
 The answer to the first question (McFarland’s) is fairly simple, if 
controversial.  Engineers and scientists have obligations to prevent society from 
being “mugged” by technology because they are members of that society.  It is 
assumed as part of the “social contract” that everyone will attempt to prevent 
significant harm to the body politic even at some (usually small) cost to him or 
herself.  Engineers and scientists simply have better-honed judgment and skills 
in discerning and dealing with particular kinds of harms.  They do not have 
“special” ethical responsibilities.  They have the same responsibilities that 
everyone else has, filtered through their special knowledge and expertise. 
 The second question (Selvan’s) is much harder to answer.  This is because 
one cannot assume that engineers and scientists have any special knowledge or 
expertise in “bettering humanity.”  Indeed, the phrase has the same looseness of 
sense as “creating the greatest good for the greatest number” which (on most 
accounts) is the job of utilitarians.  I tell my students:  “If you put a starving child 
in front of me, I know what her greatest good is.  But, what is the greatest good 
of the average American college student?  To be given A grades regardless of 
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merit?  Of course not.  Figuring out anyone’s greatest good can get pretty 
complicated.”  
 Yet, the first line of the NSPE “Code of Ethics,” requires that engineers 
“Shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the 
performance of their professional duties.”9 (p.98)    This line should receive a 
negative or admonishing interpretation--that is, do not do anything (within reason 
and fairly well-formed criteria) that interferes with other people’s liberty, 
property or other rights.  Still, many in the engineering community argue that 
this line should be interpreted positively:  that is, one has positive duties to help 
procure the safety, health and welfare of the public.  For example, the code itself 
says that “Engineers shall be of constructive service in civic affairs.”9 (p.101)  Yet, it 
is just like the code not to clarify whether this means gratuitous public service or 
not. 
 Other authors are clearer.  D. Alan Firmage argues that satisfying “an 
indispensable and beneficial social need” is part of the very “definition” of a 
profession.10 (p.63)  These are attempts to smuggle into science and engineering a 
vague and un-argued for altruism.  Altruism is the ethical theory that says we 
should seek the interests of others before ourselves and is often thought to follow 
from the Bible and other religious texts.  My own view is that unmodified 
altruism—the idea of really putting others before any thought of self--is 
nonsensical.  One always does what he thinks is in his best interest 
(psychological egoism) and he should always do what is really in his best interest 
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(ethical egoism).  This really is not the place (or the paper) to rehearse these 
arguments.  It is just necessary to point out how much Selvan obviates when he 
writes, “All human endeavors including engineering and science have, or at least 
ought to have, the betterment of humanity as their primary objective.”2 (p.573) 
 Rather, as Aristotle wrote long ago:  “All things seek the good.”11 (p.1) 
According to Aristotle, the good for man is a life of self-actualization according 
to reason and virtue, where man is a political animal.  Aristotle actually says that 
a man outside of society is not a man. Accordingly, community is good.  If so, it 
would indeed follow that each individual will seek the true good of others in 
society as part of seeking her own.  Individuals are led, as Smith said, by a 
strange sort of correspondence or “invisible hand.”  Hence, given the proper 
interpretation, and as an alternative to Selvan “All human endeavors including 
engineering and science” may perhaps have  “the betterment of humanity as 
their” secondary “objective.” 
 Ethics and science/engineering bear a complex relationship, the 
relationship of making thought practical.  Practical thought bears fruit.  Science 
and engineering often produce clearer and more ostensible dividends than 
philosophy and the arts: dividends such as televisions, computers, and bridges.  
However, science and engineering products are not themselves univocally 
beneficial.  Science and engineering also produce or help produce war, 
pornographic representation, and factory labor.  Vast stretches of science do not 
bear fruit for ages, if ever.  Vast stretches of ethical thought bear fruit (rotten or 
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healthful) every day.  How can it be said that one is more important or more 
efficient than the other?  Only on the assumption that science and engineering 
are more important can one say, with Selvan, that more discussion of one or the 
other will lead to “bettering humanity.”   
 
a.  Thanks are due to a few good reviewers from Science and Engineering Ethics 
including Stephanie Bird for pointing out the good in a long and unclear first 
draft. 
 
b.  There are some decisions in science and engineering that appear to be 
“nonethical” such as whether to use a test-tube or a beaker, whether to wear a 
white lab coat or a yellow one, and so on.  These examples are purposely cooked 
to make no difference to practice.  As a rule of thumb, however, if something 
makes no difference to practice, then it makes no difference to ethics; or, 
everything that makes a difference to practice makes a difference to ethics. 
 
c.  PV=nRT (Pressure x Volume = Number of moles x Universal gas constant x 
Temperature).  “An ideal gas is defined as one in which all collisions between 
atoms or molecules are perfectly eleastic [sic] and in which there are no 
intermolecular attractive forces. One can visualize it as a collection of perfectly 
hard spheres which collide but which otherwise do not interact with each other” 
(“Ideal Gas Law.” Georgia State U. 8 Mar. 2005 <http://hyperphysics.phy-
astr.gsu.edu/hbase/kinetic/idegas.html>). 
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